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1. All crazy for normativity!
Mainstream Kantians have an ubiquitous obsession with normativity. They 
watch their children playing with a sorting toy (i.e., one of those boxes where 
you must put the right shape into the appropriate hole) and see an agent 
engaging with normative expectations to be met . They utter an innocent lie 1
in  conversation,  as  anyone  may  do  in  ordinary  life,  and  immediately 
experience  the  compulsion  to  check  whether  their  falsehood  obeys  any 
formulation of imperatives, and it originates moral contrasts . They listen to a 2
quarrel about values and believe that they are able to distill moral reasons 
from  the  tangle  of  colloquial  strategic  moves,  behavioral  biases  and 
situational contents wherein those reasons are dissolved .  3
According to such an attitude, the practical life of human beings is nothing 
more  than  an  architecture  of  obligations,  duties,  and  concrete  ways  of 
meeting  them.  It  goes  without  saying  that  things  have  not  always  been 
regarded in this way: empiricism, for instance, constitutes a working antidote 
against the rationalist obsession with normativity. The purpose of this paper 
is to identify the point where the Kantian narrative becomes implausible and 
it  collapses into chit-chat about autonomy, universalization,  rule following 
and realms of ends.
Here  is  my  plan.  In  the  next  section  I  will  briefly  outline  an  account  of 
contemporary  Kantism.  I  will  then  introduce  a  case  study  that  provides 
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evidence  against  the  normativist  stance.  In  the  subsequent  section  I  will 
consider how Kantians may defend their view in face of the difficulties raised 
by the case study, and I will  show how such defence fails.   Finally,  I  will 
summarize in a short conclusion why heteronomous considerations cannot be 
cut in moral reasoning.
2. Varieties of behaviors and the constitution of agency.
Let us begin by discriminating between two basic patterns of action, namely, 
inattentive behaviors and sighted agency. The former consist in behavioral 
processes that flow without any focused intentionality. Inattentive behaviors 
include habits,  dispositions and attitudes that  govern how any individual 
performs actions  in  his  or  her  peculiar  way.  Automatic  processes  such as 
walking or driving a car fall into this class . Their common characteristic is that 4
individuals pay no attention to the execution of the relevant performance: at 
some point in their personal history, they learnt how to do it and no longer 
need to keep their  performance under close check.  Action has been made 
automatic by training . Consequently, inattentive behavior does not require 5
an agency that is completely in focus: actions occur intentionally, but without 
any  point-to-point  subjective  control.  Consider  Christmas  day  with  your 
family. You talk to your relatives, eat plenty of good foods, drink (if you like 
drinking),  laugh  at  jokes,  exchange  presents,  and  play  with  the  children. 
There is no need to check your behavior too closely: everything goes as it 
comes, and you just enjoy your time.
Sighted agency, on the contrary, is purposeful, intentionally focused behavior. 
Suppose you must undergo a difficult surgery. In such a case, you probably 
like to think that the surgeons and their teams will be completely engaged 
with  the  proper  thing  to  do.  In  other  words,  you want  them to  have  no 
distractions, to accurately focus on every detail,  and to consciously master 
every single move. 
Now, mainstream Kantism is a broadly construed meta-ethical view, i.e., it is 
a  theory  about  the  nature  and  constitution  of  normative  reasoning  and 
expectations.  Briefly,  such  a  position  is  prima  facie  a  conjunction  of  the 
following claims: 
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Normativism (N).  An  action  counts  as  moral  if,  and  only  if:  (1)  it  is  the 
outcome of  the  application  of  a  norm;  and  (2)  the  norm turns  out  to  be 
autonomously  established  by  the  agent’s  own  will  in  reasons  of 
considerations about how actions produce effects on other agents . 6
Rationalism (R). An agent which is performing a moral action is justified (in 
doing so) if she is able to exhibit a number of public reasons in support of the 
norm that she is applying .7
Proceduralism  (P).  The  ethical  value  of  an  action  consists  in  the  rational 
procedure  of  public  justification,  which  is  equivalent  to  giving  universal 
reasons for self-legislation .8
My  question  is:  how  does  mainstream  Kantism  approach  inattentive 
behaviors  and  sighted  agency?  It  is  a  trivial  consequence  of  N  that  only 
sighted agency can be ultimately regarded as morally relevant. Indeed, since 
inattentive behaviors are not normatively dependent on the will, they never 
qualify  as  ethical  phenomena.  This  means that  they can deserve attention 
from a moral standpoint only in reason of their blind-to-the-agent negative 
impact on freely established agency: inattentive behaviors are always to be 
condemned because they cause actions that are not the outcome of normative 
reasoning. Even if they were vehicles of ethical contents, such contents would 
not qualify as morally relevant.
Kantians  specify  the  meaning  of  N by  assuming  “R & P”.  In  their  view, 
human  agency  appears  to  have  two  main  properties:  it  is  somehow 
dependent on the intentions of individuals — agents are responsible for what 
they do -, and it is accounted for by reasons that are available to the agent — 
agents provide reasons when asked why they behaved in a particular way. 
According to mainstream Kantism, agents are responsible for what they do if 
they have reasons that support their action (assumption of R). What Kantians 
want to highlight is that the dependency of actions on intentions is not to be 
understood in terms of causality. When an agent performs an action, she does 
not simply make it occur. Her mental states, dispositions, behavioral biases, 
and acquired automatisms cannot originate actions. Otherwise, agency would 
be  compulsory  and agents  could not  be  regarded as  responsible  for  their 
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actions. On the contrary, full responsibility consists in the fact that individuals 
are sensitive to reasons in their strongest sense: when human beings consider 
the occurrence of an action, they understand it in terms of rational normative 
constraints.  In  other  words,  agents  are  free  to  decide  how  to  act  by 
considering what they should and should not do. 
As  a  consequence,  contemporary  Kantians  assume that  agency  tout  court 
consists  in  relating  actions  to  what  is  right  and what  is  wrong,  and that 
agency has a positive ethical value if, and only if, agency is constituted in 
such  a  way   (assumption  of  P).  Actually,  the  mere  fact  that  a  biological 
organism such as an human being produces some practical effects on others 
and on its environment is not sufficient to qualify it as an agent. Real ethical 
agency  consists  in  justified  actions  flowing  from  the  application  of  some 
norms .9
The peculiar way in which mainstream Kantism pictures moral life originates 
from the conjunction of “N & R & P”. It does not matter who we are, it is not 
important the network of our relationships, the kind of person that we try to 
socially  embody,  and  the  plurality  of  feelings  and  emotions  that  we 
experience towards others. The complexity of our moral life is reduced to our 
capacity  to  apply  rational  answers  to  highly  simplified,  abstracted  and 
idealized courses of actions. 
Such a framework relies on Kant’s distinction between acting in conformity 
with duty and acting from duty , which he exemplifies as follows. Merchants 10
usually apply standard prices to all their customers, that is, they deal with 
each customer in the same way. By so doing they behave honestly, and they 
are definitely in agreement with their own duty. Nonetheless, Kant holds that 
this is no cause for rejoicing. He asks: which reason do merchants have in 
support of their behavior? Not honesty itself, but their own interests: it is a 
matter of fact that dishonest merchants lose all their customers in the long 
run. Consequently, the correspondence between a merchant’s behavior and 
duty is merely accidental: they cannot be said acting from duty, because they 
are  simply  acting  in  conformity  with  duty.  Their  actions  are  motivated  by 
personal interests, and if the merchants had the opportunity to be dishonest 
with no negative consequences on their trade, they would be! 
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Kant is calling attention to the fact that, even when the behavior of merchants 
appears to follow a rule, merchants do not behave morally because they do 
not assume any relevant rule in terms of normative considerations. In other 
words, they do not act autonomously, i.e.,  they do not set themselves any 
universal law through moral reasoning.
3. The case of Ivan.
My claim is that “N & R & P” is unable to characterize the concrete ethical 
experience of individuals. Since a conjunction is false if any of its conjuncts is 
false,  providing  reasons  against  one  or  the  other  of  the  above-mentioned 
assumptions would be sufficient to refute mainstream Kantism. I will focus 
on why N should be dismissed. Consider the following argument:
1) If N is the case, inattentive behaviors do not matter to morality;
2) However, inattentive behaviors do matter to morality;
3) Consequently, N is not the case.
Let  me  add  a  few  words  about  the  modus  tollens  (1)-(3).  Evidently, 
inattentive  behaviors  are  not  the  outcome  of  the  application  of  a  norm. 
Therefore,  they  do  not  count  as  morally  relevant  (1).  Nonetheless,  my 
intuition is that inattentive behaviors do matter to morality in a full sense 
because they are subject to moral evaluations in reason of the ethical views 
they endorse  (2). Therefore, if evidential reasons support my intuition, then 11
conclusion (3) is logically warranted. The following case provides evidence 
for the assumption of (2). 
Suppose Ivan is a greengrocer. He is smart, and his shop applies very good 
prices. He also pays much thought to the best way to exercise his profession 
and is determined to respect any deontological norm that ensures good and 
responsible management practices. Nonetheless, there is something strange 
about Ivan’s shop: several pictures of Josef Stalin and other communist icons 
are  hanging  on  the  walls.  A large  Soviet  Union  flag  dominates  the  wall 
behind the checkout. Here and there you can see hammers and sickles. 
 The attitude of merchants towards their customers is evidently the result of training: they acquire the 11
skills necessary to their profession through practice. Therefore, after focusing long enough on the right thing 
to do, apprentices develop salesmen’s habits and no longer need to exercise a strong control on their own 
behavior. The way in which they receive customers, they listen to their requests and give them suggestions, 
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Naturally, many customers are disappointed by this display. When someone 
asks  him why he  appears  to  like  a  bloodthirsty  dictator,  Ivan smiles  and 
argues that Stalin was a philanthropist and that historians are servants on the 
payroll of Western capitalism. 
Now,  Ivan  is  neither  an  intellectual,  nor  a  politician.  He  is  not  really 
interested in the theory and history of communism, and has no interest in 
activism. He does not think that a revolution is imminent, or that individuals 
should actually fight to change society. His defence of red ideology is more a 
folkloric habit than a well-pondered view. 
Briefly, Ivan’s adherence to communism is a matter of personal identity. He 
was raised within a strongly politicized family. His parents were members of 
the  Communist  Party,  and he  has  spent  many hours  of  his  childhood by 
playing with the children of his parents’ communist friends. When he was a 
teenager,  many people still  believed that  the Soviet  Union was a  glorious 
alternative to the injustice of liberal societies, and Ivan shared their strong 
collective  ideals  and  dreams.   He  has  taken  part  in  communist  festivals, 
listened to communist  rock bands,  and worn typologizing clothes such as 
parka, a blue sweatshirt,  brown velvet trousers and Clarks shoes. In other 
words, communism has been the existential context wherein Ivan has been 
living his entire life. Friendships, love affairs, work, and other notable events: 
they all happened to him as a communist.
Now, is Ivan’s attitude towards communism relevant to a moral evaluation of 
his trade? Ivan and a contemporary Kantist do not think so. Ivan conducts his 
activity  by  following  universalized  norms  that  consider  customers  not  as 
means, but as ends. He only sells them excellent organic goods, never lies in 
order to achieve a profit, regularly and correctly pays his suppliers, abides to 
all  the relevant  laws,  applies  the right  prices,  and,  finally,  treats  everyone 
with the same impartiality, professionalism, and kindness. In orther words, 
since Ivan acts in reason of normative considerations about his trade, Ivan 
does not behave as Kant held merchants do, but can be said to act from duty.
Nonetheless, customers can be strongly offended by the communist photos 
and  symbols  in  his  shop.  Think  what  would  happen  if  the  relative  of 
someone who was killed in a Stalinist purge entered the grocery. She would 
probably  not  be  satisfied  with  Ivan’s  explanations.  The  reason  is  simple: 
while Ivan attributes a folkloric value to his adherence to communism and 
treats  all  the  accessories  in  his  shop  as  signs  of  his  personal  history,  the 
relative of the purge victim sees these communist icons as wounds inflicted to 
humanity, due to her family experience. She will not consider Ivan simply as 
a stupid person:  if  she  thinks  of  him as  a  moral  agent,  she  evaluates  his 
behavior as reproachable. 
Suppose that Ivan replies to her accusations. He could say: I’ve never realized 
that  the  emblems in my shop could offend anyone.  I  wasn’t  thinking about their 
meaning for the victims of communism. I’m sorry for your relatives and for how they 
lived and died. I don’t approve of what Stalin and other communist leaders did to 
them.  But  I  don’t  think  that  these  pictures  mean  that  I  condone  their  political 
decisions. They are simply a testimony of my own culture. My icons show my ideals 
and dreams. I’m neither a racist, nor a violent person. I always treat everyone with 
kindness and respect. If this were the case, even if the customer asked Ivan to 
remove the symbols, he would probably not do it.
4. Is Ivan’s case evidence against the normativist approach to morality?
A couple of interesting things follow from the case of Ivan. First, although we 
may regard our inattentive behaviors as morally irrelevant, these behaviors 
can undergo an ethical evaluation from others on the basis of the values they 
express. This is due to the fact that the actualization of a norm is a complex 
process involving also behavioral biases. Such biases can remain untouched 
by our normative practices: when an agent universalizes a rule, inattentive 
behaviors  may  simply  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the  universalization.  For 
example,  in  the  case  of  Ivan,  the  range  of  the  unconditional  imperatives 
involved in his trade concerns only the obligations of being honest with his 
customers. But others could proceed to universalizing by including different 
sets  of  obligations  within  the  procedures  that  need  to  be  normatively 
assessed. The complaint made by the relative of the purge victim seems to 
express  the  view  that  agents  are  obligated  towards  respecting  others’ 
personal life: whatever action she is performing, an agent must not offend the 
sensitivity of others. The conclusion that follows is that inattentive behaviors 
do  matter  to  morality,  although  their  impact  on  moral  agency  is  not 
dependent on the normative practices the agent adheres to. 
Naturally, mainstream Kantians would be tempted to argue that once a moral 
evaluator  rationally  claims  the  ethical  relevance  of  a  given  inattentive 
behavior to the assessment of an action, an agent who is familiar with this 
rational  claim  will  have  to  rework  her  standard  requirements  for  the 
universalization  of  norms  in  order  to  implement  how  to  deal  with  such 
inattentive behaviors. Unfortunately, such a reply goes against both reality 
and the prescriptive features of mainstream Kantism. Ivan does not remove 
the icons; and his reasons for not doing so are indeed good. On the one hand, 
while the removal option addresses the kind of human being he loves to be, 
the  complaint  made  by  the  relative  of  the  purge  victim  leaves  Ivan’s 
adherence  to  the  public  procedures  of  rational  justification  untouched. 
Consequently,  if  Ivan  holds  that  human  beings  qualify  as  rational  moral 
agents  whenever  they assent  to  public  procedures  of  rational  justification, 
Ivan has no reason to change his moral  agency in light of  the customer’s 
complaint. On the other hand, his actions as a merchant are perfectly moral 
from a deontological viewpoint. Why should he change? No persuasive facts 
would justify such a possibility. All things considered, Ivan is a good man 
and a strongly ethical greengrocer. 
The problem here is the allegedly seminal role which autonomy has in moral 
reasoning. According to the Kantian jargon, agents are responsible for what 
they do because they autonomously choose which goods are to be pursued 
and how.  Contrary  to  heteronomous  moral  doctrines  (according  to  which 
goods  precede  moral  reasoning  and  are  the  objective  criteria  for  the 
assessment of ethical matters), the autonomous view claims that goods are 
discovered through the practice of moral reasoning, and that they are chosen 
in terms of the rational procedures of justification. Although the claim that 
autonomy is  a  collective enterprise sounds more Hegelian than Kantian,  I 
concede to mainstream Kantism that a way to secure N against the ethical 
relevance of inattentive behaviors consists in the prescription of negotiating 
the universalization of rules from the public standpoint of the community of 
rational agents. 
Nonetheless, several difficulties arise. At the beginning of the story, Ivan runs 
his business by following a self-legislated moral law about how to deal with 
suppliers,  customers  and  the  tax  system  of  the  country  where  he  lives. 
Suppose that when he encounters the complaining customer, he is ready to 
listen to her complaints. As a consequence, he starts reworking a new self-
legislation of the moral principles governing his trade in order to address her 
accusations. Now, if this were the case, Ivan would not be a rational moral 
agent. Actually, no human being is facing the entire community of rational 
agents at the same time. The reasons that an agent is able to implement in her 
universalization of rules depend on how the concrete individuals she meets 
react to her moral standards, and, more importantly, on how much they are 
ready  to  communicate  their  objections.  As  a  consequence,  translating 
inattentive behaviors into sighted agency is entirely an empirical matter of 
fact: no one can answer all the normative expectations of the community of 
rational agents, for the evidential reason that we have a very partial access to 
such  expectations.  The  problem  is  hard  to  handle:  independently  on  his 
adherence to the rational procedures of justification, a Kantian moral reasoner 
such as Ivan cannot be considered a moral agent because his ability to justify 
his agency is not sufficient to answer the moral requirements of other agents 
who are not already implemented in his self-legislation of the moral law. That 
is, since the question of whether Ivan is justified in his agency whenever he 
violates  the  moral  standards  of  other  agents  requires  him addressing  the 
above-mentioned  moral  standards,  if  Ivan’s  self  legislation  violates  any 
requirements of other agents whom he did not previously acknowledge, Ivan 
is not justified in his moral reasoning. However, Ivan has a very partial access 
to moral standards of other agents. Therefore, the degree of accuracy of the 
the universalization of rules is not important: throughout their lives, agents 
will fail to meet the ethical standards and expectations of others. 
In any case, this is not the worst possible shortcoming of the public notion of 
autonomy.  If  an  agent  constitutively  depends  a  posteriori  on  others  for 
performing her moral reasoning, then a heteronomous motive is introduced 
in the justification of her moral agency. Consider the case of Ivan. The kind of 
moral agent that Ivan is does not depend on his intention to assent to formal 
procedures about how to manage his disagreement with his customers. On 
the  contrary,  he  constructs  himself  as  a  moral  agent  through his  concrete 
reaction to the content of the customer's complaints. Thus, the autonomous 
view turns out to be contradictory: on the one hand, the moral reasoning of a 
rational agent should remain independent from contraints that are not self-
legislated;  on the other,  an agent  cannot  carry out  that  reasoning without 
considering the views of other agents. In other words, the agent is unable to 
autonomously  establish  her  law  without  implementing  several  non-self-
legislated constraints.
Furthermore, the most common way to relate inattentive behaviors to moral 
evaluations consists in testing whether the actions of an agent are consistent 
with  the  principles  she  endorses.  The  problem  here  regards  the  proper 
extension of ethical judgements. According to Ivan, there is no need to call his 
entire personal life into question. Only some actions are the contents of moral 
assessments.  Kant  agrees:  he  provides  his  readers  with  different  ways  of 
understandings  how  we  are  subordinated  to  duty;  but  these  merely 
command how to perform an action . 12
Mainstream Kantians are over the moon when hearing about this approach to 
the formulation of imperatives. 
Rawls theorizes that a veil of ignorance should conceal any diversity among 
individuals. Who you are, your personal history, where you come from — 
none  of  this  matters:  you  become  a  moral  agent  only  in  terms  of  your 
acceptance of universal rules for the performance of actions . This is exactly 13
why Ivan believes to be a morally honest merchant: he does not care who is in 
front of him, and each customer receives an equal treatment. 
Habermas  goes  further  in  his  condemnation  of  the  claim  that  personal 
diversities  play a role  in morality.  The kind of  Kantian formalism that  he 
defends is  a  theory which eliminates  all  concrete  values  orientations  as  a 
mere matters of biographical interest. This implies that the claim that morality 
is a normative affair should be interpreted as morality has nothing to do with the 
concrete orientation towards values that permeates any form of life .14
Contrary to the above-mentioned formulation of the nature of ethics, the case 
of Ivan attests that moral evaluations usually address both our life as a whole 
and the values to which we adhere. A short analysis of promises provides 
evidence in support of such a claim. A promise makes sense to the individual 
who receives it only if she regards the individual who makes the promise as 
personally  trustworthy.  A known  liar  is  never  believed  when  uttering  a 
promise. The words of an inconsistent person do not carry the same weight as 
those of  a  consistent  one.  The commitments of  absent-minded individuals 
deserve  little  attention:  everyone  expects  them  to  forget  what  they  said. 
Parents know that the best way to maintain their authority and influence over 
their children is to keep their promises. Politicians are seldom believed, but if 
they are,  they are  believed in  reason of  the  consistence their  have shown 
throughout their political careers.
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All  these  examples  point  to  the  same  fact:  being  personally  trustworthy  is 
fundamental for the impact of our promises . Howevere, being personally 15
trustworthy is a matter of direct experience. Saying I trust you means that I 
am ready to believe you in terms of what I have experienced about you. Thus, 
in order to judge whether you will  keep your promise I  must perform an 
evaluation of your qualification as a moral agent. Such evaluation does not 
concern the content of your action: it concerns you as a person. Consequently, 
inattentive behaviors do matter:  in a very common case such as that  of  a 
promise,  trustworthiness  mainly  depends  on  the  degree  to  which  your 
decision to perform an action is consistent with the inattentive behaviors that 
are relevant to the actualization of your practical behavior. 
Moral evaluation can then extend from a single act of a person to the person’s 
life as a whole. For example, the relative of the purge victim does not care 
whether Ivan is a good person and an honest merchant in his daily activities. 
Upon entering the grocery store, the only thing that she sees, as a victim of 
communism,  is  that  the  owner  is  involved to  some extent  with  a  violent 
ideology of totalitarian slaughters, no matter how honest the owner tries to 
be. 
Mainstream Kantians would object, however, that the customer’s complaint 
misses the target because she is not expressing a moral criticism of Ivan’s 
behavior by complaining about Ivan’s endorsement of communism. Actually, 
she does not provide Ivan with normative considerations on why his agency 
does not follow universalized imperatives. In fact, her reproach is merely an 
emotional reaction. According to “R & P”, moral evaluations that follow from 
non rational procedures of public justification do not count as ethical facts. 
Therefore, moral criticisms derived from emotional reactions have no moral 
weight.
This way of characterizing ethical matters is highly unpersuasive, however; 
because it violates the ordinary use of moral language. Consider the life of the 
man whose photos Ivan chooses  to  exhibit  in  order  to  make manifest  his 
communist identity,  i.e.,  Josef Stalin.  It  is  uncontroversial  that he probably 
made  some  good  actions  during  his  existence.  Nonetheless,  most  people 
judge him as a  strongly immoral  person in reason of  his  stubborn use of 
 I say personally trustworthy in order to distinguish between trusting as a personal attitude towards someone we 15
are familiar with  and trusting as a prosocial attitude towards others.  Being personally trustworthy involves a 
relationship among individuals, independently on their social behavior concerning trusting others; that is, it 
does not involve generalized trusting, which is a social norm. See Bicchieri & Xiao & Muldoon (2011), pp. 
171-174.
violence as a mean to solve political disagreements. Stalin’s adherence to a 
violent political behavior is not simply the outcome of the application of a 
norm: it is the consequence of the way in which Stalin lived his life (that is, a 
consequence of how he liked to be evaluated by others). Therefore, it would 
be odd to say that Stalin is to be morally judged act by act. It would be more 
appropriate to say that he was a person without morals, but that he also of 
course occasionally did a few good things. I conclude that it is very common 
(and fundamentally right indeed) to formulate a moral evaluation of others in 
terms of their overall existence. But, such a conclusion implies that inattentive 
behaviors  are  deeply  morally  relevant:  far  from  rationally  establishing  a 
hierarchical architecture of duties, our moral life is a complex rationalization 
of  motives  derived  from  heteronomous  facts  as  emotive  reactions, 
inclinations, a multiplicity of affective relations to others (which largely shape 
our inattentive behaviors), what we learned from our own experiences, and 
our constant work on ourselves to become the kind of human being we want 
to be.
5. Concluding remarks: Autonomy vs. Heteronomy in Morality.
Moral autonomy is a strategy for the meta-ethical justification of a trivial fact: 
despite the evidence that human beings commonly disagree at the highest 
degree on moral matters, moral evaluations appear to be essentially objective 
in their nature.
Autonomous  doctrines  approach  this  fact  in  terms  of  reason  giving,  rule 
following and freedom of the will. Once a moral thinker is able to provide 
public  reasons  in  support  of  the  universal  rules  she  self-legislated,  she  is 
constituted as  a  moral  agent  and is  fully  justified in her  morally  relevant 
agency. 
Contemporary Kantism is  an unpalatable  defence  of  autonomy because it 
aims at establishing too much: (a) it accepts that moral disagreements are real; 
(b) it  asserts that rational procedures of justification are available to moral 
reasoners, and (c) it holds that rational moral thinkers have accessibility to a 
universal  and objective  law.  While  the  conjunction “(a)  & (b)  & (c)”  may 
perhaps be made consistent (I do not think so, but I do not want to argue for 
my view here), contemporary Kantism pays a high price for pursuing such an 
enterprise. 
In  order  to  dismantle  the  claim  that  moral  disagreement  implies  the 
assumption of non-objective moral law, mainstream Kantians disqualify one 
of the two sides of the disagreement by assuming that not all subjects deserve 
the status of moral agents . Moreover, according to Kantians, the correct use 16
of reason marks the boundaries between unsound and sound moral agents. 
While the former are unable to leave their subjective inclinations and private 
interests  aside,  the  latter  properly  listen  to  a  universal  inner  voice  that 
displays objective moral truths. 
This being the case, contemporary Kantism outlines an imaginary picture of 
the  ethical  experience  of  human  beings  by  disregarding  the  empirical 
phenomenology of morality. It does not matter that real moral agents find a 
plurality  of  motives  for  their  actions;  that  they  believe  to  have  objective 
values  that  orientate  their  achievement  of  goods;  that  they  are  unable  to 
ensure consistency in their lives, and that they adopt ordinary psychological 
rationalizations  in  order  to  manage  anxiety  and  uncertainty;  that  they 
sometimes  feel  fragile,  insecure,  and  sceptic;  that  they  often  behave 
differently from what they claim to be the right behavior; and, finally, it does 
not matter that they are constituted as moral agents through their relations 
with  other  human  beings  that  they  encounter  in  their  life:  according  to 
mainstream Kantians, all these facts should be removed from ethics for the 
prejudice that morality is not a descriptive affair, but it is a prescriptive one. 
In  other  words,  a  good  moral  reasoner  should  bracket  the  world  and 
whatever  she  has  learned  from  experience,  and  should  effortlessly  drive 
herself  to  become  a  fully  rational  being  dealing  with  oversimplified  and 
idealized moral situations. Whoever follows that rule acquires the status of a 
moral reasoner, and, as a consequence, is the only kind of human being who 
deserves  the  qualification  of  moral  agent.  In  a  few  words,  when  moral 
problems must be evaluated the agent is not in front of her fellow peers: she 
is beyond others indeed.
It is my opinion that the implausibility of such conclusions should prompt us 
to  distance  ourselves  from  the  stance  of  moral  autonomy.  Relying  on 
heteronomous motives  in  relation to  others  appears  as  a  potentially  more 
fruitful path to explore.
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